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A B S T R A C T
This paper analyses socially optimal nuclear plant operation and nuclear waste management. Two waiting
rules are derived: the first characterizes the optimal continuation of electricity production, and the second
gives the optimal nuclear waste disposal date. Both rules balance the cost and benefit of either continuing
production or delaying waste disposal into a deep geological repository. In addition, multiple regulatory options
are investigated. The optimized waste storage and disposal cost forms the payment that should be collected
from the nuclear power firm into a nuclear waste fund. The properties of this payment and other regulatory
options including a tax to be paid at the shutdown date of the plant are investigated, and it is shown that
the money can be collected by a plant-specific constant fee targeted at firm’s profit or output. Numerical
illustration shows that waste disposal to a deep geological repository is a cost-minimizing solution only with
very low interest rates. For interest rates above one percent it is optimal to store the waste in an on-ground
storage facility in perpetuity.1. Introduction
The disposal of spent radioactive nuclear fuel and waste has been
a problem since the beginning of the Atomic Age.1 A nuclear power
plant generates a large quantity of electricity from a small quantity of
fuel input, but simultaneously the plant produces nuclear waste as a
side-product. Spent fuel and nuclear waste are highly toxic to living
organisms and must be isolated for very long time periods. Finding an
economically, politically and technologically feasible solution for waste
management has proven to be a difficult task as shown for example
by the U.S. experience (Blue Ribbon Commission, 2012). The need to
find a solution becomes even more pressing in the future due to climate
change mitigation targets, which may require extending the operational
life-times of the existing plants and major new investments to nuclear
capacity, which results in additional nuclear waste. Given the current
and future importance of nuclear waste management, this paper aims
to contribute to the relatively limited economic literature on nuclear
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1 Isard (1948) is the first (to our knowledge) to consider nuclear power from the economic point of view, and already he points to ’’the possible problems of
transporting fissionable and radioactive materials and of disposing of radioactive waste materials’’ on page 223.
2 Interim storage means storing the waste either in a wet or dry storage facility on ground and disposal means the disposal of the waste into a deep geological
repository.
power production and waste management by analysing a model where
the plant shutdown and waste disposal dates are chosen optimally. The
model emphasizes the cost structure and waste stock properties and
suggests different options for regulation to guarantee that sufficient
funds are collected for future waste management.
Research questions. First, when is it optimal to close the nuclear plant
given that the waste must be stored in an (interim) storage facility and
eventually disposed of in a deep geological repository?2 The closure
or shutdown decision for a nuclear plant involves the revenue and
operating costs of the plant, but also costs related to the maintenance of
the plant and storage of the spent nuclear waste. In addition, continuing
plant operation produces more waste to be disposed of, which may have
an influence on the shutdown decision, and on the regulation needed
to collect the funds for waste management.
Second, what is the optimal date to dispose the waste into a geologi-
cal repository? Choosing the disposal date involves a trade-off betweenvailable online 9 September 2021
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the storage and disposal costs that is due to the waste properties.
Radioactivity and the related heat production of the waste are high
during the initial years, which means that disposing it to a deep
geological repository is too costly. Therefore it may be beneficial to
delay the disposal and to pay the storage cost for some time period
after which the waste is disposed of.
Third, how large is the total post-production waste management
cost? Calculation of this cost gives the amount of money the nuclear
power firm should have for waste management and it also forms the
total deposit to a possible nuclear waste fund. To calculate this sum,
the regulator needs information on the optimal operation and waste
management of the plant.
Fourth, when and how should the monies be collected from the
firm? As the plant generates no revenue after shutdown and as the
waste disposal occurs possibly decades after shutdown, it is important
to analyse the collection of the monies from the firm. In practice
the monies are often collected based on the electricity output, like
was done in the U.S. (Blue Ribbon Commission, 2012) or is done in
Sweden (European Commission, 2017), but setting the fee at the right
level requires information on the (optimized) total waste management
cost, which is studied here.
These questions are analysed with a two-stage model, where an
electricity and waste production stage is followed by a waste storage
and disposal stage. Waste management costs, including waste storage
and disposal costs, are assumed to depend on the decay heat generation
(radioactivity) and mass of the waste.3 The on ground storage costs
mean the costs of storing the waste in a wet or dry storage facility, and
the disposal costs include the construction costs of the deep geological
facility and the encapsulation and transportation costs. The nuclear
power plant is run at constant full capacity and generates revenue
during the production stage. The regulator chooses the shutdown date
of the production stage while taking into account that continuing plant
operation produces more waste. The waste storage and disposal stage
begins after shutdown and the regulator chooses the waste disposal
date. These choices are characterized by two rules, one for the produc-
tion continuation and the other for delaying the disposal. The optimal
dates together with the cost structure and the physical waste properties
determine the total post-operation waste management cost and the
waste management payment that is plant specific. These analytical
results are illustrated by a numerical application which shows that
deep geological disposal of the waste is a cost-minimizing solution
only with very low interest rates of less than one percent. This seems
to suggest that cost-minimization is not a sufficient reason to opt for
geological disposal, but that indefinite on ground storage should, in
fact, be seriously considered as an alternative to it unless the use of
a very low social discount rate is justified.
2. Background, literature review and contribution
Background. The average age of nuclear reactors in the European
Union is 29 years and the original life-time of the 129 operating
reactors varies from 30 to 50 years (European Commission, 2017).
Currently the EU has about 80 000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel stored at
the reactor sites.4 Contrary to the nuclear waste fund used in the U.S.,
the member states of the EU have been responsible to set-up proper
mechanisms to collect funds or other guarantees to be used for nuclear
power plant decommission and waste management.5 For example in
France, EDF is responsible for the waste management and will set aside
23 billion euros, which together with interest it believes to be sufficient
3 The possibility of accidents and fallout risks are not modelled.
4 At the end of 2010 there were 53 300 tonnes and this number grows by
200 tonnes per year (European Commission, 2017).
5 Globally, 147 reactors have been shut down but only 16 of them have2
een decommissioned (European Commission, 2017).to cover the estimated 54 billion decommission and waste management
bill (Dorfman, 2017). However, some experts say that in France as in
other European countries there are insufficient resources to guarantee
decommission of the plants and proper waste management (Dorfman,
2017; Chestney and De Clercq, 2015).
The amount of spent nuclear fuel in the U.S. was approximately
79 000 tonnes in 2017 and this amount grows by 2 000 tonnes per
year (Wealer et al., 2017; Blue Ribbon Commission, 2012). The U.S.
strategy to store and dispose spent nuclear fuel has been a costly
failure. According to the report for the Secretary of Energy (Blue Ribbon
Commission, 2012), the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and its
amendments in 1987 offered the nuclear companies a trade in which
they agree to pay 0.1 cents per produced kWh to the Nuclear Waste
Fund in exchange for the promise from the Department of Energy (DOE)
to take over the spent nuclear fuel from the companies by the year
1998, and dispose it to a suitable site such as Yucca Mountain. The
idea was that the polluter pays, and that the fund would be isolated
from federal budgetary considerations. But after the failure to find
a location for the deep geological repository in Yucca Mountain or
elsewhere, the DOE failed its promise even though the companies, or
their customers, had paid the required fees. This has lead to a series
of lawsuits against the DOE which resulted in sizeable compensations
paid from the federal budget (thus essentially by the tax payers) to
the companies.6 ,7 Currently the spent fuel is stored at the reactor sites,
which can be risky and therefore the re-opening of the Yucca Mountain
repository is seen as a relevant part of nuclear waste management
programme (Schaffer, 2011). However, the fate of the commercial
nuclear waste in the U.S. is an open question.
The plans to open a deep geological repository for nuclear waste
from commercial nuclear plants have progressed furthest in Finland
and Sweden, but the repositories are not yet open.8 In Finland, the
repository is being built and will house all of the country’s nuclear
waste from the existing plants and from Olkiluoto 3 plant, which is
under construction. The disposal is planned to commence in the mid
2020s. The purpose of the facility is to isolate the waste from the society
and ecosystems by different means: the waste is packed into copper
capsules, surrounded by bentonite clay and placed into the bedrock at
the depth of 400 m. Before disposal the spent nuclear fuel is stored in
water in pools, which cools the waste. The nuclear waste management
in Finland, including storage and disposal, is expected to cost about
6.5 billion euros (Ministry of Employment and the Economy (Finland),
2015).
Literature review and contribution. Ahearne (2011), Davis (2012)
and Lévêque (2015) give recent overviews of the challenges nuclear
power faces as an energy source including high construction costs, strict
safety regulations and various externality related problems like nuclear
waste, possibility for accidents and proliferation. A typical view on
spent nuclear fuel, like the one expressed by Lévêque, is that as the
disposal cost is realized decades after the plant closure it has only a
6 DOE’s estimate at the beginning of this decade was that the compensations
dd up to almost 21 billion dollars by 2020 assuming that the DOE fulfils its
romise to the companies by then. Moreover, ’’a programme that was intended
to be fully self-financing now has to compete for limited discretionary funding
in the annual appropriations process, while the contractual user fees intended to
prevent this from happening are treated just like tax revenues and used to reduce
the apparent deficit on the mandatory side of the federal budget ’’ (Blue Ribbon
Commission, 2012, page 72). That is, the Nuclear Waste Fund was not isolated
from budgetary considerations.
7 The fee has not been collected since 2014, but according to the audi-
tor’s report the Nuclear Waste Fund contained 44.5 billion U.S. dollars in
2017 (Department of Energy, 2018b).
8 The only open repository is in Carlsbad, New Mexico, but it is used to
dispose waste from military programmes. The total sum of liabilities related
to this class of waste in the U.S. is around 494 billion dollars (Department of
Energy, 2018a).








small effect on the present total cost of nuclear power and therefore
spent nuclear fuel is of second-order of importance. This view neglects
the fact that the total cost of waste storage and disposal is high even
in a country like Finland with a small nuclear fleet, and the payments
to the nuclear waste funds must be collected in order to prevent the
cost from rolling to the future tax payers. The cost depends on how
long the plant is run and when the waste is disposed of, but there are
only a few papers that model optimal shutdown decision of nuclear
power plants or optimal nuclear waste storage and disposal to which
the current study focuses. The study offers to our knowledge the first
economic analysis of optimal nuclear waste management from cradle
to grave.
Loubergé et al. (2002) model the choice to switch from surface
storage of nuclear waste to deep geological storage. In their model
the amount of nuclear waste at the beginning is exogenously given
and the surface storage (or interim storage) cost and disposal cost of
the waste are independent of the radioactivity (heat generation) and
the mass of the waste. In the current model the amount of nuclear
waste is optimally decided as the nuclear power plant is operated
and the storage and disposal costs depend on the heat generation and
mass of the waste. Loubergé et al. (2002) have in their model an
element that is missing from the current one, namely the stochastic
costs related to accidental releases of radioactivity. These costs are
omitted here since they can be expected to be small relative to the
construction cost and operation costs of the disposal facility. Rothwell
and Rust (1997) develop a dynamic programming model to empirically
analyse the optimal operation, refuelling and closure decision of a
nuclear power plant, when the plant may be in need of periodical
costly maintenance (such as reactor part replacement). They assume
fixed maximum operating periods (either 40 or 60 years), and show
that the stochastic occurrence of costly maintenance operations have
a significant effect on the possibility of an early closure. Hence they
analyse a similar question as we do, namely when it is optimal to shut
down the plant, but with a different driving force. Instead of stochastic
costly maintenance, in our model the waste storage and disposal, an
aspect omitted by Rothwell and Rust (1997), may affect the shutdown
decision. In addition, our focus is on the socially optimal decisions
contrary to Rothwell and Rust (1997).9
Other studies have focused on climate change and energy mix,
bequest value of waste disposal and on the effect of waste shipments
on property values. Chakravorty et al. (2012) investigate the role of
nuclear power and uranium reserves in meeting the climate goals. They
find that nuclear power can offer an inexpensive alternative for energy
production in the coming decades, but after that the increasing uranium
price and waste storage and disposal costs make nuclear power more
expensive option compared to other energy sources unless reprocessing
of the waste becomes available. Riddel and Shaw (2003) examine the
bequest value in the context of final nuclear waste disposal at the Yucca
Mountain in the U.S., and find that the current generation is willing to
sacrifice for the future generation. Gawande et al. (2013) show that the
nuclear waste shipments have a negative impact on the property values
at the vicinity of the transport route.
In addition, the nuclear power generation and waste disposal prob-
lem has similarities with exhaustible resource production as such pro-
duction leaves behind a pollution stock that needs reclamation (Lappi,
2018; Yang and Davis, 2018; Lappi, 2020). In Yang and Davis (2018),
exhaustible resource production generates a pollution stock as a side-
product, which must be reclaimed after the production has been shut
9 Even though we analyse social optimum, there are no damages caused
y the waste. This is due to the implicit assumption that the best available
echnology is applied, which effectively isolates the nuclear waste from the
iving world. This means that the waste does not cause ‘‘externality damages’’.
he damages could in principle be caused by leaks or accidents, but these
amages are not taken into account, and neither are the other social costs3
elated for example people’s risk perceptions (Huhtala and Remes, 2017).Fig. 1. The evolution of waste heat generation, when the plant is shut down at time
𝑇 and the waste is disposed of at time 𝜏.
down. There are of course multiple differences between the models,
but perhaps the most central ones are the differences in production
technology, and in that the nuclear waste stock causes negligent or zero
damages. Another difference is that, by assumption, the pollution stock
in Yang and Davis (2018) does not decay. The reclamation or clean-up
model of Lappi (2018, 2020) allows for decay of the stock, and it is
in fact used here as a starting point for modelling the nuclear waste
storage and disposal. Lappi (2020) has stock decay in his model, but
the focus is on mining.
3. Notation and assumptions
The nuclear power plant is run during the production stage [0, 𝑇 ] at
he end of which the plant is shut down at the optimal date 𝑇 . Waste
storage and disposal stage begins after the plant shutdown and this
stage covers the interval [𝑇 ,∞). During the production stage the plant
operates at its maximal constant capacity using 𝑞 units of fuel per unit
of time.10 Plant produces electricity at a constant marginal revenue 𝑝,
which is assumed to be larger than the unit cost of uranium fuel 𝑤. The
interest rate is denoted with 𝑟.
In addition to electricity, the plant produces spent nuclear fuel
(nuclear waste) to be stored and disposed of. Storing and disposing
the waste is costly and this cost depends on the mass and the heat
generated by the waste. The heat generation is described using a model
with multiple waste classes and it is presented in Appendix A.1. The
heat generation has a different time evolution during the production
stage compared to the period after shutdown. Namely, the total heat







(1 − 𝑒−𝛿𝑖𝑡), (1)
where 𝑘 is the number of different waste classes, 𝛼𝑖 is the amount of
new heat generation to class 𝑖 which is produced per unit of fuel and 𝛿𝑖
is the decay rate of heat generation in class 𝑖. Let 𝜏 be the date at which
the waste is disposed of. After shutdown, that is, at any 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇 , 𝜏], the







where 𝑛𝑖,𝑇 is the heat generation in class 𝑖 at the shutdown date. There-
fore, the heat generation of the waste grows during the production
stage and decreases during the waste storage and disposal stage. Note
that 𝑆 is strictly concave before the shutdown date and strictly convex
after it. This is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The storage and disposal costs of nuclear waste depend on the waste
mass in addition to heat generation. Mass 𝑀 grows linearly with the
10 Refuelling and other possible cessations of production are not modelled.
Energy Economics 103 (2021) 105556P. Lappi and J. Lintunenused fuel according to equation ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑞. Given zero amount of waste
at the commission of the plant, the mass at time 𝑡 is given by equation
𝑀(𝑡) = 𝑞𝑡. The waste mass at the shut down date 𝑇 is 𝑀(𝑇 ) = 𝑞𝑇 and
it stays fixed during the waste storage and disposal stage.
The cost of storing the waste in a wet or dry (interim) storage
facility is given by a convex cost function 𝑊 . The cost at time 𝑡 is
𝑊 (𝑆(𝑡),𝑀(𝑡)) with 𝑊𝑆 > 0 and 𝑊𝑀 > 0. This cost is borne as long
as the waste is stored on the surface, but when the waste is disposed
to the repository this cost becomes zero. The disposal cost at time 𝑡
depends on total heat generation at time 𝑡 and mass of the waste at the
shutdown date, and this cost is denoted with 𝐶(𝑆(𝑡),𝑀(𝑇 )), where the
cost function 𝐶 is convex with respect to 𝑆 and satisfies inequality 𝐶𝑆 >
0. This cost includes the cost related to the construction of the deep
geological repository and the transportation and encapsulation costs. In
principle this cost could be used to describe the share of the centralized
storage facility cost, if the interest would be on the trade-offs between
decentralized and centralized storage (Wealer et al., 2017), rather than
between storage and disposal like here. In addition to these costs, the
nuclear plant components must be maintained, repaired and possibly
replaced as the plant ages. These repair or maintenance costs are
assumed increasing in the age of the plant and captured by a convex
function 𝐾 with 𝐾 ′(𝑡) > 0. Before moving on to analyse the model, it
should be highlighted that any costs or damages due to fallout risk and
accidents are not explicitly modelled.
4. Waste storage and disposal stage
The model is analysed backwards starting from the waste storage
and disposal stage, which begins at the shutdown date 𝑇 of the plant.
The total heat generation and the waste mass at time 𝑇 are inherited
from the production stage, which is analysed in Section 5. The problem
for the regulator is to minimize the total discounted waste storage and
disposal costs by choosing the disposal date given heat decay and fixed








𝑊 (𝑆(𝑡; 𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 ))𝑒−𝑟𝑡 d𝑡 − 𝐶(𝑆(𝜏; 𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 ))𝑒−𝑟𝜏
}
, (3)
where 𝑆(𝑡; 𝑇 ) = ∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖,𝑇 𝑒
−𝛿𝑖𝑡 by Eq. (2) and 𝜏 is the disposal date (after
shutdown). The model has a more specific pollution stock description
than the one in the clean-up model of Lappi (2018). The first result
about the optimal waiting rule is essentially the same as in his model,
and in the current context it characterizes the choice of the optimal
date to dispose the nuclear waste to a deep geological repository. It is
possible that the problem in (3) has no solution. In this case the waste
is stored in an on-ground facility forever. Although the focus here is on
commercial waste, this rule can be also used to characterize the disposal
decision of nuclear waste from past military programmes.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the waste storage and disposal problem (3)
has a solution 𝜏∗ ∈ (0,∞). Then the optimal nuclear waste disposal date 𝜏∗
satisfies the following equation:







𝐶(𝑆(𝑡; 𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 )).
Proof. See Appendix A.3. □
This equation can be interpreted as follows. On the left-side is the
cost of waiting with the nuclear waste disposal, which is the amount of
interim waste storage costs that are borne during an additional waited
time unit. On the right-side is the corresponding benefit of waiting,
which describes the development of present value of the waste disposal
cost. It has two parts. First, waiting one more unit of time means that
the waste disposal cost is moved one unit of time to the future. This
saved cost is valued at the interest rate. Second, waiting one more unit
of time implies that the heat generation is decreased. Since the disposal4
cost is increasing in the heat generation of the waste, the disposal cost
is decreased by waiting one time unit. In practice the heat generation
is very high during the first years after the shutdown and decreases
at a relatively fast pace. This means that the benefit of waiting also
decreases and a time instant may be found at which the disposal cost
has reached a low enough level to warrant disposal.
Next we find sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the solution
to the maximization problem.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the number of waste classes is greater than
one, 𝑟𝐶𝑆𝑆 − 𝑊𝑆𝑆 ≥ 0 and 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆 ≥ 0. Then the solution to waste storage
and disposal problem in (3), if it exists, is unique.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. □
This result states that the solution (if it exists) is unique given that
there are more than one nuclear waste class, the interest rate is high
enough (𝑟 ≥ 𝑊𝑆𝑆∕𝐶𝑆𝑆 ) and the third derivative of the disposal cost
function with respect to the heat generation is non-negative. These
conditions for the partial derivatives need not hold in general, but
note that they do hold for example when 𝐶 is quadratic or linear and
𝑊 is linear with respect to the heat generation. The optimal disposal
date depends on many parameters, and it is denoted with 𝜏∗ = 𝜏(𝑇 ).
Hence the explicit dependency is shown only for the shutdown date.
The dependency on the other parameters, such as the decay parameters,
is left out from the notation.
The value function of the waste storage and disposal problem in (3)
is defined as
𝑉 (𝑇 ) ∶= −∫
𝜏∗
0
𝑊 (𝑆(𝑡; 𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 ))𝑒−𝑟𝑡 d𝑡 − 𝐶(𝑆(𝜏∗; 𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 ))𝑒−𝑟𝜏
∗
. (4)
It gives, after multiplying by −1, the amount of money needed to carry
out the nuclear waste storage and disposal after the nuclear power plant
has been shut down. Discounting this from the shutdown date 𝑇 to
the plant commission date 𝑡 = 0 gives then the amount of money that
must be deposited to a fund at the commission date to cover in full
the storage and disposal of the spent nuclear waste (assuming that an
interest is paid using rate 𝑟). Similarly to Lappi (2020), this sum also
acts as the scrap value for the production stage problem to be analysed
in the following section. At this point, we assume 𝜏∗ satisfies a sufficient
condition for a strict local maximum presented in Appendix A.5. This
additional assumption is made in order to analyse the properties of the
scrap value function using an envelope theorem.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the waste storage and disposal problem has
a solution 𝜏∗ ∈ (0,∞). Then 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.5. □
This result means that an extension of the production horizon of the
power plant increases the amount of funds that must be deposited at
the commission date of the plant. Moreover, inspection shows that an
increase in 𝑇 increases the amount of deposited funds irrespective when
this deposit is done. Before moving onto the analysis of the production
stage, note that if it is never optimal to dispose the waste, the value of
this stage consists only of the discounted interim waste storage cost.
5. Production stage
The plant is operated at the maximal fixed capacity 𝑞 and there-
fore the choice is only made on the plant’s operation life-time 𝑇 .11
11 Licensed plant life-times vary a lot between plants and range from 30
to 50 years in Europe (European Commission, 2017). In the U.S., licences
have been granted for 40 years, but almost all plants have received a 20
year extension for their licence (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012).
Even longer life-times for the existing plants have been discussed.



















































Neglecting the decommissioning costs (or including them into the scrap
value as a constant), the problem for the regulator is to maximize the







(𝑝 −𝑤)𝑞 −𝑊 (𝑆(𝑡),𝑀(𝑡)) −𝐾(𝑡)
)
𝑒−𝑟𝑡 d𝑡 + 𝑉 (𝑇 )𝑒−𝑟𝑇 , (5)
where 𝑆 is given by (1) and 𝑀(𝑡) = 𝑞𝑡. The following result character-
izes the optimal shutdown date for the nuclear plant:
Proposition 4. Suppose that the shutdown problem (5) has a solution
𝑇 ∗ > 0. Then the optimal shutdown date of the nuclear power plant satisfies
the following equation:
(𝑝 −𝑤)𝑞 − 𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 ) = 𝑊 (𝑆(𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 )) +𝐾(𝑇 ) − 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ).
Proof. See Appendix A.6. □
An interior optimal shutdown date for a nuclear power plant equal-
izes the benefit and cost of continuing electricity production in the
plant. The benefit consists of the net revenue (𝑝 − 𝑤)𝑞 and of the
interest on the avoided waste storage and disposal stage value. The cost
of continuing production is the sum of the additional interim waste
storage cost, 𝑊 , the repair cost, 𝐾, and the loss due to waste build-
up induced decrease in the waste storage and disposal stage value, 𝑉𝑇 .
To compare this shutdown date to the case where the post-production
waste storage and disposal decision is omitted, rewrite the rule as
(𝑝 −𝑤)𝑞 −𝑊 (𝑆(𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 )) −𝐾(𝑇 ) = 𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 ) − 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ), (6)
where the right-side describes the development of the present value
of the waste management payment −𝑉 .12 When the waste storage
and disposal decision is omitted, the optimal shutdown date for the
plant equalizes the left-side of (6) with zero. If the present value of
the waste management payment is decreasing at the shutdown date,
i.e., 𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 ) − 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ) < 0, the production stage is longer than when
neglecting the waste storage and disposal costs. If the opposite holds,
the production stage is shorter.
6. Optimal payment and regulation
In principle, there are multiple ways, such as trust funds or letter
of credits, in which the resources to cover future waste management
costs can be collected. Our main focus here is on the amount of money
needed for management, and we only consider some specific forms
of schemes such as direct payments by the operator. The amount of
money the nuclear power firm must deposit to the nuclear waste fund
by the shutdown date is the total waste storage and disposal cost, which
has been discounted to the optimal shutdown date 𝑇 ∗. This amount is
directly given by the value of storage and disposal stage −𝑉 (𝑇 ∗), and
it depends on many parameters of the model including interest rate,
capacity of the plant and net unit revenue. Possibly the most interesting
relationship is between the payment and the interest rate. Note that
the value of 𝑉 depends on the interest rate 𝑟 directly (see Eq. (4)), but
this is not shown in the notation to avoid clutter. To investigate the
relationship between the payment and the interest rate, the payment
function is denoted with 𝑃 and defined as
𝑃 (𝑟) ∶= −𝑉 (𝑇 (𝑟)), (7)
where 𝑇 (𝑟) ∶= 𝑇 ∗ is the optimal shutdown date of the plant. It is
assumed that the second derivative of the objective function (5) with
respect to 𝑇 is strictly negative at 𝑇 = 𝑇 ∗.
12 The reason why the comparison is possible is that the left-side of (6) is
trictly decreasing in 𝑇 .5
Proposition 5. If d∕d𝑟(𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 ∗) − 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ∗)) > 0, then 𝑇𝑟(𝑟) < 0, and if
∕d𝑟(𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 ∗)−𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ∗)) < 0, then 𝑇𝑟(𝑟) > 0. The sign of 𝑃 ′(𝑟) is given by the
ign of −𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 (𝑟))𝑇𝑟(𝑟) − 𝑉𝑟(𝑇 (𝑟)), and is generally ambiguous.
roof. See Appendix A.7. □
The effect of waste management on optimal plant shutdown date
s captured by the term 𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 ∗) − 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ∗), which is the net cost of
ontinuing electricity production (evaluated at the optimal shutdown
ate) that is due to post-production waste management costs. Note that
∕d𝑟(𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 ∗) − 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ∗)) = 𝑉 (𝑇 ∗) + 𝑟𝑉𝑟(𝑇 ∗) − 𝑉𝑇 𝑟(𝑇 ∗), where the first and
he third term are strictly negative and the second is strictly positive.
he proposition implies that if the net cost increases as the interest rate
ncreases, the optimal shutdown date decreases. If the cost decreases,
hen the shutdown is delayed. As the plant shutdown may be brought
orward or delayed as a result of an increase in the interest rate, the
ffect of interest rate on the optimal payment 𝑃 is ambiguous. However,
f the net cost of continuing production increases due to an increase in
he interest rate (implying that 𝑇𝑟 < 0), the payment decreases as both
he direct effect of the interest rate on the payment, namely −𝑉𝑟, and
he indirect effect, −𝑉𝑇 𝑇𝑟, are strictly negative. The other case, where
he payment increases due to an increase in the interest rate requires
hat the increase in the interest rate causes a relatively large increase
n the shutdown date of the plant.
For any interest rate, the amount of money required for the socially
ptimal waste storage and disposal is given by 𝑃 in Eq. (7). Hence
he regulator must collect this amount from the firm or receive other
ufficient guarantees. In addition, the regulation must give the firm
ncentives to shutdown the plant at the socially optimal shutdown date
∗. To guarantee in the above sense the proper operation of the plant
nd management of the waste, the regulator has multiple regulatory
ptions, which are discussed below.
Regulation 1: The first option is to simply set the optimal shut-
own date that the firm must respect to 𝑇 ∗ and a lump-sum payment
𝑉 (𝑇 ∗)𝑒−𝑟𝑇 ∗ to be paid when the plant begins its operation. Of course,
f there is no risk of insolvency, the firm can be required to pay amount
𝑉 (𝑇 ∗)𝑒−𝑟(𝑇 ∗−𝑡) at some date 𝑡 after the commission of the plant. Both
f these work, but their drawbacks are clear: Full payment at the
ommission date requires possibly a lot of funds from the firm upfront,
ut delayed payment comes with the risk of bankruptcy.
Regulation 2: The second option is to set a tax that depends on the







(𝑝 −𝑤)𝑞 −𝑊 (𝑆(𝑡),𝑀(𝑡)) −𝐾(𝑡)
)
𝑒−𝑟𝑡 d𝑡 − 𝛬(𝑇 )𝑒−𝑟𝑇 , (8)
here 𝑆 solves (1) and 𝑀(𝑡) = 𝑞𝑡. Therefore setting 𝛬(𝑇 ) = −𝑉 (𝑇 )
akes the firm solve the regulator’s problem and the firm chooses the
ptimal shutdown date 𝑇 ∗.13 The tax is paid at the shutdown date,
hich might be a problem if the firm is at a risk of insolvency.
Regulation 3: The third option for regulation is to require the firm
o pay (any) fraction of its profits at any time instant into a nuclear
aste fund with the requirement that the fund’s monies will be used
o finance the waste storage and disposal after the plant has been shut
own. This means that the regulator announces at the commission date
f the plant that the amount of funds at the shutdown date 𝑇 , which
s chosen by the firm, must equal −𝑉 (𝑇 ). Firm’s incentives can be






(𝑝 −𝑤)𝑞 −𝑊 (𝑆(𝑡),𝑀(𝑡)) −𝐾(𝑡)
)
(1 − 𝜃(𝑡))𝑒−𝑟𝑡 d𝑡
(9)
13 Similar regulation is analysed in many contexts, for example by Loeb and
Magat (1979), Kim and Chang (1993) and Yang and Davis (2018).











































s.t ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑟𝐵(𝑡) + 𝜃(𝑡)
(
(𝑝 −𝑤)𝑞 −𝑊 (𝑆(𝑡),𝑀(𝑡)) −𝐾(𝑡)
)
, (10)
𝐵(0) = 0, 𝐵(𝑇 ) = −𝑉 (𝑇 ), (11)
where 𝐵(𝑡) denotes the amount of money in the fund at time 𝑡, and,
again, 𝑆 solves (1) and 𝑀 = 𝑞𝑡. The objective here is to first show that
for a firm that obtains strictly positive discounted profit and meets the
constraint set by the regulator, any payment function is optimal and
that the optimal shutdown date equals the socially optimal shutdown
date 𝑇 ∗. Second objective is to present a formula for a constant payment
scheme, since in practice the nuclear waste fee is often a constant.14
Proposition 6. If the firm makes a strictly positive profit, then the plant
is shut down at the socially optimal date with any payment function that
collects sufficient amount of money for waste management. A constant fee
to the nuclear waste fund is given by
𝜃 =









Proof. See Appendix A.8. □
Hence the constant fee equals the ratio between the discounted
waste management payment and the total discounted profit from the
plant. This constant belongs to (0, 1) since the objective function of the
regulator obtains a strictly positive value at the optimal shutdown date
(otherwise there would be no reason to commission the plant). In the
above the fee is paid as a fraction of the profit, but other types of fees
are used in practice. For example, in the U.S. and Sweden the fee is
based on the produced electricity. The fee was in the U.S. 0.1 cents per
produced kWh. A fee based on the produced electricity is given by
𝜃 =
−𝑉 (𝑇 ∗)𝑒−𝑟𝑇 ∗
𝑞(1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇 ∗ )∕𝑟
∈ (0, 1), (12)
hich is obtained by similar arguments as the result in the previous
roposition and by integration (note that the amount of money trans-
erred to the account at any time instant is 𝜃𝑞). Irrespective of the
orm of the fee used, the fee varies across plants if the plants are
eterogeneous with respect to marginal revenue, capacity, fuel price,
epair costs or waste management costs. This is contrary to the practice
f collecting the same fee from all the firms (or plants).
. Application
The model is illustrated by a numerical application, which is based
n the available data on an Olkiluoto 3-type plant (EPR).
Data and calibration. Table 1 presents the data on the plant spec-
fications, fuel costs and prices. Prices and unit costs are assumed to
emain constant during the plant’s operation life. Annual fuel use is
iven by equation 𝑞 = 𝑌 ∕𝜂𝛽 and the data on Table 1 gives as the fuel use
pproximately 32.5 tU/year. The annual net revenue from electricity
eneration is constant [(𝑝− 𝑐𝑂𝑀 )𝜂𝛽 ⋅ 24 ⋅ 1000−𝑤]𝑞 = 390 million euros.
The disposal cost function and the interim waste storage cost func-
ion are assumed to have the following forms:
(𝑆,𝑀) = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1
𝑆
𝑀
+ 𝑐2𝑀, and 𝑊 (𝑀) = 𝑤0 +𝑤1𝑀. (13)
The interim waste storage cost, 𝑊 (𝑀), is assumed to be independent
of waste heat generation, 𝑆. Data exists to fix plausible values for
the parameters 𝑐2 and 𝑤1, but there is only partial data available
for the other parameters. For this reason parameters 𝑐0 and 𝑤0 are
calibrated for an assumed parameter value 𝑐1. The operator of Olkiluoto
3 plant has estimated that the plant will be operational for at least
14 Lappi (2020) contains a similar result except for the constant fee formula
n a mining context, but there the regulator sets directly the terminal date at
he socially optimal level. Here the date is a choice variable for the firm.6
Table 1
Plant and fuel specifications and prices.
Parameter Value and unit Description
𝑝 40 EUR/MWh Electricity pricea
𝛽 45 GWd/tU Fuel burnupb
𝜂 0.37 Thermal efficiencyb
𝑌 13 TWh Annual electricity productionb
𝑐𝑂𝑀 11.57 EUR/MWh Unit O&M costc
𝑤 1.25 mEUR/tU Unit fuel costd
aNord Pool electricity price.
bSource: Teollisuuden Voima (2010).
cSource: International Energy Agency (2015).
dSource: World Nuclear Association (2019).
Table 2
Waste storage (interim storage), disposal and repair costs.
Parameter Value and unit Description
𝑤1 653 EUR/tU Marginal interim storage costa
𝑐𝑟 3500 mEUR Disposal facility costb
𝑐1 0.1 mEURtU/W Disposal cost parameter (heat)c
𝑐2 0.112 mEUR/tU Disposal cost parameter (mass)a
𝑘1 320 mEUR Repair cost parameterc
𝑘2 5 mEUR/year Repair cost parameterc
𝑘3 60 years Repair cost parameterc
aSource: Nuclear Energy Agency (2013).
bSource: Posiva (2016).
cSource: Assumed.
0 years (Teollisuuden Voima, 2010), and this date is used in the
alibration exercise. When Olkiluoto 3 reactor becomes active, Finland
ill have five operational commercial reactors, and the waste from
hese reactors will be disposed in a single repository. The cost of this
epository including encapsulation facility has been estimated to be
round 3 500 million euros (Ministry of Employment and the Economy
Finland), 2015; Posiva, 2016), and the waste share of Olkiluoto 3 plant
s 37 percent.15 The interim waste storage cost for a plant that generates
030 tonnes of waste is approximately 14.15 mEUR/year (Nuclear
nergy Agency, 2013). The disposal cost is calibrated for a situation
here most important heat generation has diluted away. Therefore,
00 years is used for the calibration disposal date. With a description
f the decay heat evolution after plant shutdown (presented below),
ne knows the decay heat generation at the disposal date. This is








∕𝛿𝑖. The waste mass is 𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 60𝑞. Hence, using
he functional forms in (13), the parameters 𝑐0 and 𝑤0 obtain values
𝑐0 = 0.37 ⋅ 3500 − 𝑐1
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙
𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑙
− 𝑐2𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑙 , and 𝑤0 = 14.15 −𝑤1𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑙 . (14)
Table 2 presents the necessary storage, disposal and repair cost
arameters. The repair cost function form is assumed to be given by
(𝑡) = max{0, 𝑘1 + 𝑘2(𝑡− 𝑘3)}. This form and the parameter values from
able 2 imply that the plant operator must pay for repairs for some
ime before and after the life-time of the plant (60 years) used in the
alibration of the waste storage and disposal functions.16
Waste decay and production parameters for the waste classes (𝛿𝑖 and
𝑖) are estimated using the heat generation data of an EPR-type plant
vailable in Anttila (2005). The decay heat generation was estimated
15 Posiva (2016) has estimated that Olkiluoto 3 produces 2030 tU over its
estimated 60 year plant life-time, and therefore the waste share of Olkiluoto
3 is 2030∕(950 + 2500 + 2030) ≈ 0.37 (Posiva, 2016).
16 In addition, the decommission cost of the plant are assumed to be one
fifth of the total decommission cost of all Finnish plants. The total cost is 1000
million euros (Ministry of Employment and the Economy (Finland), 2015), so
the Olkiluoto 3 plant’s share is 200 million euros. This is paid when the plant
is shutdown.
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Table 3
Waste decay and production parameters.
Source: Own estimations.
Parameter Value (1/year) Parameter Value (W/tU)
𝛿1 4.0 𝛼1 42000
𝛿2 5.7 ⋅ 10−1 𝛼2 19000
𝛿3 2.3 ⋅ 10−2 𝛼3 2400
𝛿4 2.1 ⋅ 10−3 𝛼4 340
𝛿5 7.5 ⋅ 10−5 𝛼5 40
from data covering 0.11 years to 10 000 years. The details of estimation
are presented in Appendix A.9. Five decay modes was deemed sufficient
representation of the heat generation process. The results of these
estimations are presented in Table 3. The two decay modes with highest
heat generation decay rapidly as their decay timescales are 0.25 and
1.75 years. The third decay mode with 40 year decay timescale is
the most relevant in the context of the study. Two last decay modes
represent relatively small share of decay heat generation and remain
relatively stable in the time frame of interest.
With the data in the tables, the calibrated cost parameters equal
approximately 𝑐0 = 1030 and 𝑤0 = 12.9. Fig. 2 shows the evolution of
the heat generation, heat–mass ratio and the waste management costs
in the calibration case. Note that the interim storage cost 𝑊 is fixed
after plant shutdown.
Solution method. The quantitative model is solved using a discrete
time approximation with annual time periods. The model is solved in
two steps. In the first step, the optimal disposal time is solved for all
feasible production horizons. In the second step, the production horizon
is optimized given the optimal solutions for the disposal problems. The
compact structure of the problem allowed calculation of all possible
production horizon and disposal time combinations. The optimum was
chosen by a simple search algorithm.
In addition to the first-best solution, we solved a problem where the
firm has a higher discount rate than the regulator. The regulator uses
its low discount rate to determine optimal disposal time. The firm is
obligated to use this disposal time, which is non-optimal from its point
of view. The regulator’s problem is solved like the first-best problem
and it determines a regulated disposal time. The firm’s problem needs
modification. In the first step, instead of optimizing the disposal time,
the value of waste is calculated for all feasible production horizons
using the regulated disposal time. In the second step, the production
horizon is optimized using the value of waste with the regulated
disposal time.
Results. Given the quality of the available data and uncertainties
surrounding the key parameters related to waste management costs,
the following numerical results should be taken as illustrative only.
In short, the main result is that disposal of nuclear waste into a deep
geological repository is optimal only with a low interest rate of around
one percent. This means that from the cost minimization point of view
it is cheaper to keep the waste in a ’’interim’’ storage facility indefinitely
instead of constructing an expensive final disposal facility. For a one
percent interest rate the plant is run for 61 years (see the first row of
Table 4). This is followed by an interim storage period after which the
waste is disposed of 51 years after shutdown. The present value of the
profit from the plant including the waste management costs is around
6230 million euros, which is far less than the cost estimate for the
construction of the Olkiluoto 3 plant (around 8500 million euros). The
discounted waste management payment is around 742 million euros,
when the regulator’s discount rate is applied. However, if a larger
interest is paid, say five percent, the payment is only 65 million euros.
Table 4 shows the sensitivity of the model output with respect to
interest rate, disposal cost parameters 𝑐0 and 𝑐1, and price of electricity.
The first two rows of Table 4 show that as the interest rate is7
ncreased from one percent to three or five (or just to two percent), thecost-minimizing solution is to store the waste in the ’’interim’’ storage
facility indefinitely instead of disposing it at some date. Increasing
the interest rate has a small effect on the shutdown date, but has a
large effect on the discounted profit from the plant. The discounted
waste management payment drops significantly as the interest rate is
increased.17
Varying the disposal cost parameters 𝑐0 and 𝑐1 has no significant
effect on the shutdown date of the plant, discounted profit or the dis-
counted waste management payment. However, decreasing the value of
𝑐0 by ten percent, and thus decreasing the benefit of waiting, brings the
disposal date significantly forward from 51 to 26 years after shutdown.
Increasing the parameter value by ten percent has the opposite effect.
Similarly, decreasing the value of parameter 𝑐1 decreases the disposal
date, and an increase in 𝑐1 results in an increase in the disposal date
(see also Fig. 3).
As expected, the price of electricity has a significant effect on the
profitability of the plant. A ten euro decrease in the price decreases the
shutdown date and results in a relative small discounted profit, but an
increase of the same size leads to significant extension in the plant’s
production horizon and more than doubles the discounted profit. Even
though the high electricity price increases the shutdown date and
more waste is produced, the discounted waste management payment
decreases due to discounting.
In the above first-best solution with one percent interest rate, it is
optimal to dispose the waste 51 years after plant shutdown.18 However,
the firm might have higher interest rate than this, say five percent.
In that case it would not be optimal from the firm’s point of view to
dispose the waste at all and the plant would be shut down at year
63 (see the second row of Table 4). What is the effect of designing
the disposal date with one percent interest rate on the shutdown
date chosen by the firm and on the present value waste management
payment when the firm uses five percent rate? Our numerical model
shows that the regulation leads the firm to shutdown the plant at year
64, that is, one year after the shutdown date with the regulation that
is designed using the firm’s interest rate. In addition, the present value
waste management payment is 2.9 million euros larger.
8. Conclusions, caveats and possible further research
This paper analyses the socially optimal nuclear power production
and waste management using a two-stage model, where the operation
duration for a constant capacity nuclear power plant is decided together
with the date to conduct the final disposal of the nuclear waste into a
deep geological repository. The study emphasizes that postponing the
disposal may decrease the overall waste management costs as the delay
in disposal decreases the costs as radioactivity or heat generation of
the waste decays. In addition, the numerical illustration shows that the
policy that advocates disposal in a deep geological repository may be
misguided from cost perspective as on ground storage in perpetuity
is cheaper at least for interest rates higher than one percent. In any
case, the waste management fee must be designed separately for every
individual plant as the plants are not identical in their capacities, prices
and reactor designs.
However, the model is based on multiple simplifications. First, the
disposal of the nuclear waste produced by the plant is assumed to occur
instantaneously at the chosen disposal date. In reality, however, the
process of disposing the waste is an ongoing gradual process after the
deep geological repository has been built. The simplification makes the
trade-offs related to timing clear, but may imply imprecise waste man-
agement costs. Therefore replacing this assumption with a continuous
17 The presented payment numbers are obtained by fixing the last possible
date to dispose the waste at 500 years, which means that the numbers are
only slightly off from the true ones, where only the interim storage cost is
paid indefinitely.
18 Given the base case parameter values reported below Table 4.
Energy Economics 103 (2021) 105556P. Lappi and J. LintunenFig. 2. Evolution of the waste heat generation, heat–mass ratio, interim storage cost and the disposal cost, when the plant is shutdown after 60 years of operation.Table 4
Sensitivity of the solution with respect to key parameter values.
Parameter value 𝑇 𝜏 Discounted profit −𝑉 (𝑇 )𝑒−𝑟𝑇 −𝑉 (𝑇 )𝑒−0.05𝑇
Base case 61 51 6230 742 65
𝑟 = 0.03 62 ∞ 4980 75 22
𝑟 = 0.05 63 ∞ 3850 12 12
𝑐0 = 930 61 26 6270 703 61
𝑐0 = 1140 61 113 6200 769 67
𝑐1 = 0.05 61 22 6240 734 64
𝑐1 = 0.15 61 67 6230 745 65
𝑝 = 30 35 50 1320 912 225
𝑝 = 50 87 56 12980 603 19
Parameter values are varied one-by-one relative to the base case with 𝑟 = 0.01, 𝑐0 = 1030, 𝑐1 = 0.1
and 𝑝 = 40. The unit of the discounted profit and the discounted waste management payment is
million euros.waste disposal process may yield more precise quantitative information
for policy.
Second, accident and fallout risk during waste management op-
eration was not explicitly modelled. These risks can be expected to
be different between on-ground storage and geological disposal. A
quantification, although a difficult task, might yield relevant insights
on optimal waste management and disposal timing.
Third, our planning solution approach omits the interaction be-
tween private plant operator and public authorities. For example, in a
model with accident and fallout risks, the question of liabilities could be
important. This might provide a line for future studies. Our model did
not include explicit taxes. Yet, a decentralization of the planning model,
should also consider corporate taxation. The present model implies a
constant tax rate on profits but a more complicated tax structure could
have an impact on quantitative results. This is left for future studies.
Fourth, a relevant aspect of the current policy discussions is the
possibility of extending the life-times of the plants in the existing
nuclear fleet. These extensions come with interesting trade-offs because
extensions would postpone the decommission, but also produce more
waste. An investigation of this, combined possibly with price and
cost uncertainty, might be an option for future research. Relatedly,
the plant operator may become insolvent during its operation with
possible adverse effects, for example, to tax payers. This means that
an investigation of firm’s liability and also the means for collecting the
money for waste management are possible topics for future research.8
Finally, the model and the related options for regulation presented
in Section 6 assume complete information. Implementation of some of
the options, where the payment is partly based on the socially optimal
shutdown date, need information on the parameters related to plant
operation including prices and maintenance costs. But to implement
some of the options the regulator needs only to know the waste storage
and disposal costs in order to form the waste storage and disposal
payment that depends on the shutdown date chosen by the firm. In
practice this information, in particular the disposal cost, is difficult
to obtain, and it may be private information for the firm. Hence a
possibility for future research is to investigate the optimal mechanism
that can be used to formulate the (second-best) payment. This might
mean that the tax payers must bear some of the waste storage and
disposal costs.
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Fig. 3. Sensitivity of the solution with respect to disposal cost parameter 𝑐1 that multiplies heat–mass ratio (with 𝑟 = 0.01, 𝑐0 = 1030 and 𝑝 = 40). Objective function value is the
















.1. A model for heat generation
To model the heat generation of the waste, the waste is divided
nto 𝑘 classes according to the speed at which the heat generation
iminishes. The size of class 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘 at time 𝑡, 𝑁𝑖(𝑡), describes the
ecay heat generation of that waste class, and the time evolution of
hese classes depends on whether the plant has been shut down or not.
hen the plant is operational the classes evolve according to equations
̇ 𝑖(𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖𝑞 − 𝛿𝑖𝑁𝑖(𝑡), (A.1)
where 𝛼𝑖 describes the amount of new heat generation to class 𝑖 which
is produced per unit of fuel and 𝛿𝑖 is the decay rate of heat generation.
The heat generation is zero at the commission date of the plant. As
electricity is produced the heat generation grows according to (A.1).
The heat generation in class 𝑖 at the shutdown date is denoted with
𝑛𝑖,𝑇 ∶= 𝑁𝑖(𝑇 ). After the plant has been shut down no new waste is
produced and therefore equations
?̇?𝑖(𝑡) = −𝛿𝑖𝑁𝑖(𝑡) (A.2)
describe the evolution of the heat generation classes until the time the
waste is disposed of. Solving equations in (A.1) and (A.2) gives the







for 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇 ], (A.3)
and
𝑁𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑛𝑖,𝑇 𝑒
−𝛿𝑖(𝑡−𝑇 ) for 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇 , 𝜏], (A.4)





∕𝛿𝑖. Hence the evolution of these classes is determined by
the choice of the shutdown date 𝑇 and the disposal date 𝜏. The total





𝑖=1Note that 𝑆(0) = 0 and 𝑆(𝑇 ) = ∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖,𝑇 . Eqs. (1) and (2) given in the
text follow from the above equations.
A.2. Waste storage and disposal stage problem







𝑊 (𝑆(𝑧− 𝑇 ; 𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 ))𝑒−𝑟(𝑧−𝑇 ) d𝑧−𝐶
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here we abused the notation with










n introduction of the change of variables 𝑡 = 𝑧 − 𝑇 with 𝜏 ∶= 𝜏 − 𝑇
ransforms this problem into problem in (3).
.3. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows Lappi (2018) and is straightforward. A solution to
he maximization problem (3) is a stationary point of the Lagrangian




𝑊 (𝑆(𝑡; 𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 ))𝑒−𝑟𝑡 d𝑡−𝐶
(
𝑆(𝜏; 𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 )
)
𝑒−𝑟𝜏 + 𝜆𝜏. (A.8)
ut since it is assumed that 𝜏∗ ∈ (0,∞), multiplier 𝜆 equals zero, and the
equired formula follows from the definition of 𝐿 by direct calculation
nd inspection using equation 𝐿𝜏 = 0, or equivalently, equation
𝑊 (𝑆(𝜏; 𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 )) + 𝑟𝐶(𝑆(𝜏; 𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 )) − 𝐶𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏; 𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 ))?̇?(𝜏; 𝑇 ) = 0.
(A.9)
.4. Proof of Proposition 2
Denote the heat generation of the waste at time 𝑡 with 𝑆(𝑡). The
ime-derivative of 𝑆 reads



























































The sign of this derivative is determined by the sign of the difference























































herefore all the terms of type 𝛿4𝑖 𝑛
2
𝑖,𝑇 𝑒
−2𝛿𝑖𝜏 are eliminated from the
ifference ?̈?(𝜏)2 − ?̇?(𝜏)𝑆(𝜏). Terms of the following type are left:
𝛿2𝑖 𝑛𝑖,𝑇 𝑒
−𝛿𝑖𝜏𝛿2𝑗 𝑛𝑗,𝑇 𝑒
−𝛿𝑗 𝜏 − 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑇 𝑒
−𝛿𝑖𝜏𝛿3𝑗 𝑛𝑗,𝑇 𝑒































)2 < 0. (A.19)
herefore ?̈?(𝜏)2 − ?̇?(𝜏)𝑆(𝜏) < 0 for all 𝑘 > 1. The claim follows. □
roof of Proposition 2. Suppose that the problem has two solutions
enoted with 𝜏1 and 𝜏2, and let 𝜏1 < 𝜏2. Then there exists a local
inimum between these maximums. Denote it with 𝜏min. The second
erivative of the objective function evaluated at any of these dates can
e written using Eq. (A.9) as
−𝑊𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 )) + 𝑟𝐶𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 ))−𝐶𝑆𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 ))?̇?(𝜏)
)
?̇?(𝜏)
− 𝐶𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 ))?̈?(𝜏), (A.20)
and it is non-positive at the maximum points (𝜏1 and 𝜏2) and non-
negative at the minimum point (𝜏min). Since ?̇?(𝜏) < 0,
(






at 𝜏 = 𝜏1 and at 𝜏 = 𝜏2, and
−𝑊𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 )) + 𝑟𝐶𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 )) − 𝐶𝑆𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 ))?̇?(𝜏)
)
−
𝐶𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 )) ≤ 0 (A.22)10
?̇?(𝜏)∕?̈?(𝜏)at 𝜏 = 𝜏min. Use the left-sides of these inequalities to define function 𝑓
from [0,∞) to R with
𝑓 (𝜏) =
(











s strictly increasing, because its derivative is












by Lemma 1. Furthermore, the derivative of function
𝜏 ↦
(
−𝑊𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 )) + 𝑟𝐶𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 )) − 𝐶𝑆𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 ))?̇?(𝜏)
)
(A.26)
an be written as
̇ (𝜏)
(
𝑟𝐶𝑆𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 ))−𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 ))
)
−𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 ))?̇?(𝜏)2 − 𝐶𝑆𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 ))?̈?(𝜏), (A.27)
hich is non-positive by the function form assumptions. This means
hat function 𝑓 is strictly decreasing, and therefore 𝑓 (𝜏1) > 𝑓 (𝜏min) >
(𝜏2). These inequalities contradict (A.21) and (A.22).
.5. Proof of Proposition 3
The choice set of problem in (3) is not compact and the objective
unction is not (necessarily) concave. Therefore the envelope theorems
n Milgrom and Segal (2002) cannot be applied. Recall the assumption
hat 𝜏∗ satisfies the following sufficient condition for a strict local
aximum:
−𝑊𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 )) + 𝑟𝐶𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 )) − 𝐶𝑆𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 ))?̇?(𝜏)
)
?̇?(𝜏)
− 𝐶𝑆 (𝑆(𝜏),𝑀(𝑇 ))?̈?(𝜏) < 0
(A.28)
at 𝜏 = 𝜏∗. Given the above assumption, an envelope theorem presented
in Carter (2001, Corollary 6.1.1) can be applied. By the envelope
theorem, the partial derivative of the value function 𝑉 given in (4) with
respect to the variable 𝑇 evaluated at 𝑇 equals the partial derivative of
the objective function given in (3) with respect to 𝑇 evaluated at 𝑇 and
at 𝜏∗. Therefore















Recall that 𝑆(𝑡; 𝑇 ) = ∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖,𝑇 𝑒










−𝛿𝑖𝑇 𝑒−𝛿𝑖𝑡 > 0. (A.30)
Furthermore, since 𝑊𝑆 > 0, 𝐶𝑆 > 0, 𝑊𝑀 > 0 and 𝐶𝑀 > 0 everywhere,
𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ) < 0.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 presented in
Appendix A.3. Proceeding as there gives equation
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(𝑝 −𝑤)𝑞 −𝑊 (𝑆(𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 )) −𝐾(𝑇 )]𝑒−𝑟𝑇 + 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 )𝑒−𝑟𝑇 − 𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 )𝑒−𝑟𝑇 = 0,
(A.31)
from which the result follows.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 5
Eq. (A.31) can be rewritten as
[(𝑝 −𝑤)𝑞 −𝑊 (𝑆(𝑇 ),𝑀(𝑇 )) −𝐾(𝑇 )] + 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ) − 𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 ) = 0. (A.32)
Assume that the second derivative of the objective function with respect
to 𝑇 , 𝛴(𝑇 ), is strictly negative at 𝑇 ∗. The implicit function theorem
implies that
𝑇𝑟(𝑟) =
𝑉 (𝑇 ∗) + 𝑟𝑉𝑟(𝑇 ∗) − 𝑉𝑇 𝑟(𝑇 ∗)
𝛴(𝑇 ∗)
, (A.33)
where 𝑉 (𝑇 ∗) + 𝑟𝑉𝑟(𝑇 ∗) − 𝑉𝑇 𝑟(𝑇 ∗) is the derivative of 𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 ∗) − 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ∗)
with respect to 𝑟. Hence, if d∕d𝑟(𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 ∗) − 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ∗)) < 0, 𝑇𝑟(𝑟) > 0, and if
d∕d𝑟(𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 ∗) − 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ∗)) > 0, 𝑇𝑟(𝑟) < 0, as required.
Differentiation of the payment function (7) with respect to 𝑟 gives
𝑃𝑟(𝑟) = −𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 (𝑟))𝑇𝑟(𝑟) − 𝑉𝑟(𝑇 (𝑟)). (A.34)
A.8. Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the problem in Eqs. (9)–(11) and denote 𝛱(𝑡) ∶= (𝑝−𝑤)𝑞−
𝑊 (𝑆(𝑡),𝑀(𝑡)) −𝐾(𝑡). Hamiltonian is
𝐻(𝜃, 𝐵, 𝜂, 𝑡) = 𝛱(𝑡)(1 − 𝜃)𝑒−𝑟𝑡 + 𝜂(𝑟𝐵 + 𝜃𝛱(𝑡)), (A.35)







0 if −𝛱𝑒−𝑟𝑡 + 𝜂𝛱 < 0,
any 𝜃 ∈ [0, 1] if −𝛱𝑒−𝑟𝑡 + 𝜂𝛱 = 0,
1 if −𝛱𝑒−𝑟𝑡 + 𝜂𝛱 > 0,
(A.36)
?̇? = 𝑟𝐵 + 𝜃𝛱, (A.37)
?̇? = −𝑟𝜂, 𝜂(𝑇 ) = 𝛽, 𝛽 is a constant, (A.38)
19 Theorem 2 of Chapter 3 in Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987).11𝛱(𝑇 )(1 − 𝜃(𝑇 ))𝑒−𝑟𝑇 + 𝜂(𝑇 )(𝑟𝐵(𝑇 ) + 𝜃(𝑇 )𝛱(𝑇 )) + 𝛽𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ) = 0. (A.39)
learly 𝜂(𝑡) = 𝑘𝑒−𝑟𝑡 for some constant 𝑘. As −𝛱𝑒−𝑟𝑡+𝜂𝛱 = 𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝛱(𝑘−1),
< 1 and (A.36) imply that 𝜃 = 0 for all 𝑡 and hence no money is
eposited to the account and the constraints are violated. 𝑘 > 1 implies
hat 𝜃 = 1 for all 𝑡, which means that the total discounted profit for
he firm is zero. Hence 𝑘 = 1. As 𝜂(𝑡) = 𝑒−𝑟𝑡, 𝛽 = 𝑒−𝑟𝑇 and condition
A.36) implies that any payment function 𝜃 is optimal. Using Equation
(𝑇 ) = −𝑉 (𝑇 ), Eq. (A.39) reduces then to
(𝑇 ) − 𝑟𝑉 (𝑇 ) + 𝑉𝑇 (𝑇 ) = 0. (A.40)
his matches, after reorganization, the equation in Proposition 4, and
herefore 𝑇 = 𝑇 ∗.
Suppose the fee is given by a constant 𝜃. The solution to Eq. (10)
ith the initial condition 𝐵(0) = 0 is




(𝑝 −𝑤)𝑞 −𝑊 (𝑆(𝑧),𝑀(𝑧)) −𝐾(𝑧)
)
𝜃𝑒−𝑟𝑧 d𝑧. (A.41)






(𝑝 −𝑤)𝑞 −𝑊 (𝑆(𝑧),𝑀(𝑧)) −𝐾(𝑧)
)
𝑒−𝑟𝑧 d𝑧 = −𝑉 (𝑇 ∗)𝑒−𝑟𝑇
∗
. (A.42)
he result given in the proposition follows from this.
.9. Decay estimation
The decay heat generation data for spent nuclear fuel of an EPR
eactor was obtained from (Anttila, 2005, page 303). Although planned
urnup in OL3 is less than 50 MWd/kgU, we use decay heat data for
urnup of 60 MWd/kgU, which has been a design criteria for Finnish
ncapsulation plant (Raiko, 2012, page 131). The data consists of decay
eat generation, as a function of time, when the fuel is removed from
he reactor at time zero. We utilize data from 0.1 years to 10 000 years
fter the removal.
The data is presented in Fig. 4 by black circles. We identified
ive exponential decay modes and estimated their parameters using
on-linear regression. The regression equation was











where 𝜈𝑡 is error term. The regression equation describes the decay
f one unit of spent fuel, i.e., it describes the decay heat generation
dded to the heat generation stock in each moment of time. That
s, the regression is made on lim𝑇→0 𝑆(𝑡)∕(𝑞𝑇 ), where 𝑆(𝑡) is given
by Eq. (2). Hence, parameters 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛿𝑖 have the usual amount of new
heat generation and the decay rate interpretations, respectively (see
Section 3).
The logarithmic transformation was used to balance the estimation
to the whole data range. Without log-transformation, the estimation
overemphasized the initial period of high heat generation. The fitted
values are presented in Fig. 4 by red crosses. The fit is reasonably good
over the whole data range. The five mode formulation of decay heat
seems sufficient for the purposes of this paper.
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